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We study the link between middle-management ability and store labour productivity using data
from 245 stores of a UK nationwide retailer. The company scores six broad areas of
management practice, the most important of which turns out to be “commercial awareness”,
where able managers achieve 17% higher labour productivity in their stores compared to less
able ones. We further show that the managers’ incentive pay scheme, required to encourage
them to exert their ability in full, is implicitly an insurance one, with managers taking a share in
deviations of actual sales from expected. At the same time, abler managers do not receive higher
pay all else equal, which implies that middle management ability is not fully tradeable.
Abstract in Dutch
In deze studie bestuderen wij de relatie tussen enerzijds de vaardigheden van het
middenmanagement en anderzijds de arbeidsproductiviteit in een grote Britse detailhandelketen.
Dit bedrijf kent zes brede domeinen van managementpraktijk, waarvan ‘commercial awareness
(commercieel bewustzijn)’ de belangrijkste blijkt. De winkels die door de meest bekwame
managers worden bestuurd zijn gemiddeld 17% productiever dan winkels met minder bekwame
managers. De studie toont verder aan dat de meest bekwame managers niet meer verdienen dan
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This study investigates the link between management and economic performance at the
establishment level. Our unique data enable us to assess the overall contribution of the
important, but elusive, management factor of production, as well as partition it into standards of
practice and personal abilities. We also examine the pay system that the ﬁrm uses to make the
most of its management stock.
Our data come from 245 stores belonging to a large UK clothing retailer. By comparing
subunits within a ﬁrm, all of which apply the same standards to measuring the management
input, we obtain essential control over our key management variables. In this respect, our study
is similar to that by Grifﬁths et al. (2006) who collect data on management ability and
productivity within the branches of a single organisation, a nationwide UK building materials
ﬁrm. Overall, therefore, our organisation’s hundreds of stores scattered nationwide provide a
unique experimental setup within which to analyse the relationship between middle management
ability, pay and productivity.
We measure management ability using the company’s own survey of six key behavioural
indicators (KBIs): “sales focus”, “commercial awareness”, “developing people”, “drive and
personal development”, “leadership”, and “planning and organising”. Depending on the
evidence provided for each of the survey’s questions, each participating store manager was given
one of the three grades for each KBI – “development need” (signifying inadequate performance),
“capable” (minimum appropriate performance) and “strength” (exceptional performance).
There are two parts to our analysis. First, we establish the link between labour productivity
in each store and the manager’s ability as measured by his/her KBIs. We obtain plausible
estimates of the differences in labour productivity between stores run by managers with different
KBI grades, with commercial awareness being the most important. We also derive the
contributions to labour productivity of management practices (the difference in productivity
between the grades capable and development need, 11%) and management ability (the difference
between strength and capable, 6%).
In the second part of our analysis, we consider manager pay incentives, which, we argue, are
key to explaining why some managers perform above the required standards. We ﬁnd that, while
managers do not have explicit performance pay contracts, they do share in both positive and
negative deviations of store productivity from expected.
781 Prior literature and our study
Management has been put ﬁrmly among the factors determining labour productivity in the
academic literature (see Bartelsman and Doms, 2000). The literature distinguishes between
management ability and management practices, a distinction we also adopt. Performance
rankings are often used to measure ability. Thus, Alvarez and Arias (2003) use an establishment
ﬁxed effects ranking as a measure of management input, and ﬁnd that it reduces average costs of
production. Similarly, output has been found to be positively correlated with rankings on
inventory, sales, strategic management (Baumel and Fuller, 1964; Sonka et al., 1989), product
quality and sales and budget goal attainment (Mefford, 1986).
Grifﬁths et al. (2006) use a wider “balanced scorecard” approach to assess management
ability in each store in a UK building materials wholesaler, averaging manager scores on
ﬁnancial, customer satisfaction, innovation and internal controls criteria. They ﬁnd a movement
from the lower to the upper quartile in management ability to account for 40% of the
interquartile range of labour productivity (p. 523), which is close to our result. Bloom and
Van Reenen (2007), using a more sophisticated measure of management input, ﬁnd that the same
movement explains 10-23% of the interquartile total factor productivity (TFP) range (p. 1371).
Our estimate for total factor productivity is higher, which we explain.
Another approach to controlling management ability is to isolate it by allowing for a manager
ﬁxed effect. Mundlak (1961) pioneered this approach. Estimating a production function for a
number of farms over years, he found reductions in factor input elasticities once the local
manager ﬁxed effects were added – a ﬁnding implying a positive correlation between
management and other inputs and a positive “elasticity” of management input with respect to
output. (Lucas (1978) derived a theoretical model explaining why better managers should be
employed in bigger ﬁrms, which explains the reported reduction in input elasticities more
completely.)
A number of studies have used manager ﬁxed effects ever since. Thus, Lieberman et al.
(1990) found top management to be a major source of productivity differences between
American and Japanese car manufacturers. citebertrand also report that particular top managers
signiﬁcantly affect ﬁrm policies and returns on assets, using a sample of 2,300 large U.S. ﬁrms.
While the ﬁxed-effects approach is useful (we too use ﬁxed effects for area managers), our
management data allow more insight into the workings of management than simply sweeping
them out via ﬁxed effects.
The literature on management practices concerns individual practices as well as “bundles”.
Most studies on individual practices have looked at human resource management (HRM).
Signiﬁcant improvements in ﬁrm performance have been found with more employee training
(De Grip and Sieben, 2005; Dearden et al., 2006), better communication between employees and
management (Kersley and Martin, 1997; Bartel, 2004), greater employee participation in
9decision making (Black and Lynch, 2004; Srivastava et al., 2006), and performance-related pay
and promotion (Kahn and Sherer, 1990; Audas et al., 2004). Performance pay is a particularly
powerful practice, as shown by Bandiera et al. (2007) who found a 21% increase in workers’
productivity in response to the introduction of managerial performance pay (see also Lazear
(2000) who found a 44% productivity increase following a shift from ﬂat to piece wage rate.)
Performance pay for store managers plays an important role in explaining our results. Our
measure of HRM practices, however, does not fare well in the productivity regressions, which
we explain.
Some studies looked at practices outside HRM. Galbraith and Nkwenti-Zamcho (2005)
report a positive impact on labour productivity of equipment maintenance, ﬁrm reorganisation
and labour specialisation. Bertschek and Kaiser (2004) also found signiﬁcant productivity
effects from workplace reorganisation to encourage team work and reduce hierarchy, using a
sample of 411 service sector ﬁrms in Germany. Their ﬁndings further emphasize “strategic
complemetarity” which exists between management practices and the production process in a
ﬁrm. We see some evidence of this complementarity in our study, when we ﬁnd that HRM
practices are unimportant for productivity when labour is mainly unskilled and turnover is high.
An alternative to considering particular aspects of management is to conceptualise it as an
aggregate input into the production function. Thus, Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) surveyed four
areas of management practices – operations, monitoring, targets and incentives (18 practices
altogether) – in companies across four countries, and found that all practice areas (and many
individual practices) are important for labour productivity. We too use indicators from a wide
range of practices, ﬁnding, however, that not all of them are signiﬁcant.
Several studies look at the effects of management practice “bundles”. Arthur (1994)
classiﬁes HRM policies into “control” and “commitment” HRM systems and ﬁnds workplaces
with a “commitment” HRM system to have higher labour productivity. Ichniowski et al. (1997)
report a similar ﬁnding, having grouped the observed HRM practices into four systems, from the
most traditional (i.e., control) to the most innovative (i.e., commitment, or high-performance).
They also ﬁnd the impact of HRM practices to be at its maximum when they are grouped into
bundles that reinforce complementarities between them, a ﬁnding also reported in Macdufﬁe
(1995). As a robustness check to our main results, having grouped management grades together,
we too ﬁnd some evidence that management practices complement each other.
102 Statistical model and estimation issues
Following the modelling approach of Ichniowski et al. (1997) and Bartel (2004), we went to
meet the company’s managers for ideas on the model to describe sales of an individual store. We
took a series of interviews between February and October 2006 and came up with the following
description.
2.1 Store sales
A store receives goods and sells them after adding a certain mark-up. Sales depend on the cost of
sales, labour and store space, as well as store, area and workforce characteristics, including store
management. It is also affected by various unobservable circumstances, both speciﬁc to a
particular store (e.g., unobserved location characteristics) and idiosyncratic (e.g., temporary
disruptions in business). We do not have data on the cost of sales, but, plausibly assuming that it
is a constant fraction of the total sales, we will abstract from it. We also control for the
possibility of different goods having different mark-ups by controlling for store type and
location and the share of children’s goods in total sales.
The observed sales volume is the outcome of solving the problem of allocating limited
resources between the stores by the central management in the long and medium run, and
delegating this solution in the short run to the local store managers. By deﬁnition, in the long run
(several years in our case) all inputs are variable. In the medium run, while capital and
management inputs are given, labour input may be corrected taking into account changes in
operating environment and newly acquired information. This correction takes place at the
beginning of the accounting year (February), by allocating an annual wage budget to each store
equal to an agreed fraction of its last year’s sales (the average for 2005 was around 10%). In the
short run (i.e., within the year), store managers allocate labour between weeks to utilise their
wage budget, while all other variables remain given. In so doing they must match labour inputs
to seasonality of sales, with peak periods at Christmas, Easter, and the start of the school term.
This simple description lends itself to the following short-run (for the year 2005) sales
function:
yit = f(lit,st,xi)+ui +eit, (2.1)
where i and t are store and week counters; y is log sales; l is log weekly labour input; s is a
weekly dummy to capture seasonality of sales; x is the vector of other explanatory variables,
containing management; u and e are unobservable store-speciﬁc and idiosyncratic shocks to
sales, respectively. Notice that l has all two indices because labour input varies by store and
week, while the weekly dummies are the same for all stores (hence no store index i) and the
other controls, though different across stores, are ﬁxed for the duration of the year (hence no t
11index). The unobservable shock to sales ui follows a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process:
ui = φ ·ui,−1+ηi , (2.2)
where 0 < φ < 1 is the autoregression parameter, ηi is annual random noise in sales which
follows a continuous distribution with zero mean and a ﬁnite second moment and is independent
of the regressors and serially uncorrelated; also cov(ui,ηi,+1,2,...) = 0.
The proﬁt-maximising solution of the resource allocation problem in the long run implies
proportionality between the inputs. So, given the input prices, we expect to see better managers
appointed to bigger size stores and managing more labour. This allocation of managers to stores,
and labour to managers, is consistent with the theoretical insight of Lucas (1978) that better
managers control more assets. In the medium run, however, capital and management inputs are
ﬁxed. Thus the only way to adapt to changes in trade environment is to adjust annual labour
input. Part of this adjustment happens in response to changes in trading environment, and part is
due to changes in the expected value of the unobservable term, E(ui) = φ ·ui,−1 (equation (2.2)),
implying that labour input in the current year (2005 in our case) is a positive function of the last
year’s unexpected sales, ui,−1, which is consistent with the company’s actual wage budget
practice 1.
With capital and management inputs ﬁxed and the trading environment exogenous, ui,−1 is






). Therefore, we can regress the annual labour input on the rest of the
observed variables that are constant throughout the year (xi),
lnLi = xi ×g+ξi , (2.3)
and use the residuals from this regression (ξi) as a proxy for ui,−1 in the sales function.
Controlling for ui,−1 is useful because it allows us to estimate the annual random noise in sales
(η) which will be needed in the manager pay equation.
We have learnt from management interviews some of the structural elements of the sales
function. However, the function cannot be fully identiﬁed without accounting for store
managers’ effort. Because management ability requires effort to be brought out, we need to
model a mechanism through which the company can provide incentives for its store managers.
In fact, while incentives are “the essence of economics” (Prendergast, 1999, p. 7), no study of
1 For an illustration, consider a Cobb-Douglas sales function with two inputs, labour (L) and capital (K). Maximising
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ipeφ·uip−1 is the Lagrange multiplier. The positive log-linear relationship between L and u
still holds, albeit approximately, for a more general constant elasticity of substitution (CES) sales function speciﬁcation,
through a log-linearisation of the applicable ﬁrst-order condition for labour input.
12management in the context of a production function has yet internalised them in the modelling of
the management-performance link. The next subsection outlines a variant of the standard
performance pay model which describes a plausible incentive mechanism.
2.2 Store manager pay
We apply a simple agency model of performance-related pay in the spirit of Holmstrom (1979)
and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), which is reasonable given that store sales are an easily
available measure of manager performance (problems with distorted measures are discussed,
among others, in Baker (2002)). The model predicts that, when effort can only be monitored
imperfectly (which is true for a geographically dispersed organisation such as ours), in order to
induce the manager to exert effort, part of her pay must be conditioned on her output. In our
case, salaries are mostly ﬁxed at the start of the trading year and bonuses are too small to be
economically important. However, as explained to us by the company’s HR department, the
company does take into account store managers’ sales performance in the past year, as well as
the labour market situation, when reviewing manager contracts for the next trading year. This
practice is tantamount to having explicit incentive pay contracts.
The model describes a one-period game between a risk-neutral principal (the company) and a
risk-averse agent (the store manager). The agent produces output (y) which depends on her
effort (ε), observable to her only, ability (c), observable to both parties, and the annual random
noise term (η), observable to none2 (all letter notations are the same as before, store subscripts
are suppressed for simplicity):
y = η if ε = 0,
y = ε +c+η if ε > 0. (2.4)
The manager receives a wage (w) from the principal which in part depends on the past period’s
output,
w = α +βη if ε = 0,
w = α +β(ε +c+η), if ε > 0,
α,β ≥ 0,
and maximises utility,




where parameters δ > 0 and λ > 0 represent the cost of effort and aversion to uncertainty
regarding the realised value of output. (Our assumption that delta is invariant with respect to
2 There are, of course, other determinants of output, but since they do not depend on store managers (unlike c and ε) and
are assumed to be observed to both parties (unlike η), we will abstract from them.
13management ability is admittedly heroic, but we test it below.) The optimum level of effort that





and she will work for the principal only when her utility given the effort,




is at least as high as her reservation utility, ¯ u(z,c) (the reservation utility is allowed to vary with
ability c and other parameters z reﬂecting the outside options available to the manager, e.g., pay
for similar occupations in the area).
The principal maximises
P = E(y −w) = ε +c−α −β(ε +c),
given the agent’s reservation utility and effort, and derives the optimal wage contract as follows:


















Equations (2.6) - (2.8) allow us to make several observations regarding the assumed behaviour of
the principal and agent, as follows. First, if there is no incentive pay (i.e. β = 0) the agent will
make no effort at all; if, however, there is incentive pay it is always optimal for the agent to exert
some effort. Second, the model predicts that the extent of incentive pay, β∗, and the exerted
effort, ε∗, are the same for all managers; and therefore, given all other determinants, sales vary
only due to ability and random noise (η) which we estimate from the sales equation3. (A more
complex model in Schaeffer (1998) results in ε∗ also being dependent upon store size; we
control for this possible dependency in robustness checks below.) Third, the incentive part of
manager pay (fraction times η in equation (2.8)) depends not on observed output, but on
unexpected output (η), because the observed components of output are absorbed by the ﬁxed
wage component and proﬁt.
3 This implication does not hold for other speciﬁcations of the output equation (2.4). For example, assuming x = ε ·c+η
results in ε,α and β being nonlinear functions of c. We do a robustness check of the results derived under equation (2.8)
(see Table 4.3.2), but ﬁnd no signiﬁcant difference in the coefﬁcient estimates for η between different KBI grades, and
hence no evidence to reject our simple speciﬁcation.
142.3 Estimation issues














αk1k2zk1itzk2it +ui +eit, (2.9)
where K is the total number of variables in vector z (which includes l, s and x from equation
(2.1)), and αk1k2 = αk2k1. The translog is an approximation to a large class of production
functions (notably CES, see Christensen et al. (1973)), imposing few restrictions on the
curvature of the production possibility frontier. In our case, the translog fares slightly better than
Cobb-Douglas in terms of overall signiﬁcance, though the results from the two are qualitatively
the same.
Working with weekly data for sales and employment, it is important to allow for gradual
adjustment of actual sales to their predicted level. We therefore introduce lags of the dependent
and explanatory variables in the regression equation (2.9), which, after replacing ui with










where M = yit−1−åk βkzkit−1− 1
2 åk1 åk2 βk1k2zk1it−1zk2it−1− φ ·ui,−1−ηi. Here the αs are the
instantaneous, and βs are the “long-run” effects of the model variables on sales, 1−γ measures
the speed of adjustment of the actual sales to their predicted level, and vit is an idiosyncratic,
serially uncorrelated error term. As discussed earlier, we proxy the last year’s unexpected sales,
ui,−1, with the residuals ξi from the total annual labour input equation 2.3.
Following Black and Lynch (2004) and Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), we estimate equation
(2.10) in two steps. First, we obtain estimates (ˆ αs, ˆ βs and ˆ γ) for the time-varying variables
(weekly labour input, week dummies, lagged dependent variable) and recover store ﬁxed effects
(which at this stage include x, the proxy for last year’s unexpected sales, ξi, and the annual
random noise term, ηi). At the second step, we regress the store ﬁxed effects on the x and ξi. We
calculate the input elasticities at the means of the respective variables, for example
∂y/∂zk = βk +2βkk ¯ zk + å
κ6=k
βκ ¯ zκ.
The standard errors for the elasticities are computed from Monte Carlo simulations, given the
regression coefﬁcients’ point estimates and variance-covariance matrix.
As in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), we instrument labour input to control for biases due to
simultaneous determination of inputs and output by an unobserved process (see Blundell et al.
(2000) for a more detailed discussion of input simultaneity), using lags of labour input from 2 to
5 as instruments, but ﬁnd that instrumentation makes little difference to the estimates. Using
data from a single company helps ensure that time-varying unobservables are the same for all
15stores and thus can be captured by the week dummies, so that simultaneity is not so much of a
problem in our data. We choose not to instrument the lagged dependent variable, because the
bias to its estimate due to correlation with the store ﬁxed effect is negligible in long (52 weeks)
panels, such as ours. We also test for autocorrelation in the ﬁrst-step residual, vit, ﬁnding which
would imply an incorrectly speciﬁed model because in that case cov(vit,yit−1) > 0, contrary to
the assumption of orthogonality between the error term and regression variables. Our preferred
translog speciﬁcation passes this test.
It only remains to estimate the store manager wage equation (2.8). Assuming the manager’s
reservation utility to be log-linear in its arguments, we regress log total salary on manager ability
and practices (the KBI’s), store and area characteristics, and, following our incentive pay model,
the annual random noise term, η, which is the time-invariant component of the residual from
equation (2.10). A ﬁnding that the estimate for η is signiﬁcant would conﬁrm the existence of an
incentive mechanism for store managers.
In summary, our estimation procedure relies on linking the results of different equations.
First, the residual ξi from the labour input equation (2.3) is used as a proxy for the last year’s
unexpected sales, ui,−1, in the sales equation (2.10). Then the time-invariant error term from
equation (2.10), η, is used in estimating the manager pay equation (2.8). This linking, based on
simple theoretical arguments (the AR(1) process for unexpected sales, which is consistent with
the company’s wage budget practice, and the incentive pay model), ensures that our estimation
procedure is internally consistent.
163 The data
Our analysis runs through the data collected for the trading year February 2005 to February
2006. The reason for taking only one year’s worth of observations is to ensure that the same
manager was in charge of a given store for the entire study period. All managers who
participated in the survey must have been running their stores for at least a year as of February
2006. There are 245 such stores.
Our data come from a number of sources. Company accounting records provide weekly data
on sales (our dependent variable) and hours worked (our measure of labour input), as well as
sales assistant and store manager characteristics (age, gender, contract hours, dates hired and
left, turnover, pay). The data on management ability come from the company’s in-house survey
run by its HR department (see below).
We also use as controls area data which include average hourly earnings by occupation (from
the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey), the unemployment rate and the number of competitors
in the local area. The data on competitors come from the company’s own survey of stores with
the same main business and situated within a given store’s catchment area. Finally, we use the
following store characteristics: space (our measure of capital input), location, brand, and share
of children’s products. With a few observations missing or discarded (e.g., store being
temporarily closed), the resulting dataset contains 12,671 complete observations for 245 stores
over 52 weeks.
3.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.1 summarises our data, beginning with store characteristics. The average store is, in UK
terms, comparable to a small enterprise, employing 314.5 worker-hours of labour a week (8.4
full-time-equivalent (FTE) workers, 1 week = 37.5 hours), and occupying about 150 square
metres of space. Hence, we take our dataset as enabling an analysis of some 245 small
enterprises. At the same time, despite the fact that they are all part of the same company, selling
the main brand of medium-priced casual clothing and generally located in large shopping
centres, our enterprises vary considerably in productivity. As can be seen the standard deviation
of productivity across stores is £15.07, giving a coefﬁcient of variation relative to mean
productivity of 25% (=15.07/59.93). It is this high variation in productivity that we aim to
understand.
Our organisation needs to accommodate large ﬂuctuations in business by season and day of
the week, which requires a ﬂexible workforce. Indeed, most of the staff work less than 15 hours
per week. There is also high employee turnover (FTE quit rate = 0.15, hiring rate = 0.08),
characteristic of the retail sector. Such ﬂuid conditions present a challenge to the store manager
who must match labour input to ﬂuctuating demand while keeping turnover under control.
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Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev.
Store characteristics
Sales per hour worked 12671 59.93 15.07
total hours worked per week 12671 314.48 211.76
Store space in square meters 245 148.98 82.47
Store belongs to: main brand 245 0.93 0.26
other brands 245 0.07 0.26
Store location: stand-alone, city centre 245 0.13 0.34
stand-alone, local area 245 0.1 0.3
sub-regional shopping centre 245 0.44 0.5
regional shopping centre 245 0.16 0.37
other 245 0.17 0.36
Share of children’s products in total sales 245 0.29 0.11
Sales assistants characteristics
Average sales assistant’s age, years, adjusted for full-time equivalence (FTE) 245 34.71 6.61
Average sales assistant’s tenure, years, FTE 245 7.26 3.71
Share of male sales assistants, FTE 245 0.13 0.14
Share of sales assistants working: 0–4 hrs per week 245 0.33 0.19
5–14 hrs per week 245 0.25 0.17
15–30 hrs per week 245 0.22 0.16
30+ hrs per week 245 0.2 0.1
Sales assistant’s average hourly pay 245 5.02 0.23
Area average hourly pay for a similar joba 21 7.49 0.87
Number of sales assistants working on an average week 12656 15.32 11.06
Number of sales assistants ever worked during the year 245 22.47 17.04
Separations rate, FTE 245 0.15 0.11
Hiring rate, FTE 245 0.08 0.07
Area characteristics
Area average pay 21 11.05 1.54
Area unemployment rate 21 0.05 0.01
Number of competitors in a store’s catchment area 245 36.45 25.89
Store manager characteristics
Manager age (years) 236 38.06 10.09
Manager experience (years) 236 10.71 6.38
Store manager is male 236 0.27 0.44
Manager hourly pay (based on 1,900 hours worked per year), data for 2006 236 11.24 2.59
Share of bonus payments in total pay 236 0.028 0.034
Area average hourly pay for a similar jobb, data for January–September 2006 21 11.06 1.45
a Intermediate, routine and semi-routine sales and services (categories 7.2, 12.1, 12.2 and 13.1 of the Labour Force Survey occupation
classiﬁer).
b Lower managerial (category 5.0) and lower and higher supervisory occupations (categories 6.0 and 10.0).
18The average area pay and unemployment are in line with the national averages. Competitive
pressure, however, varies quite dramatically, averaging at a rather high level, 36.45 stores in the
catchment area. High competition is thus another challenge store managers must face.
As for store managers, we see that an average manager is in her late 30s, and has been with
the company for a considerable part of her working life (indeed, many were recruited from the
ranks of the sales assistants). Most of the managers are women, but the share of men (0.27) is
twice as high as for sales assistants. Their average pay rate in 2006 (£11.24 per hour) exceeds
that for similar occupations in the area (£11.06 per hour) – unlike that of sales assistants. (Note
that the manager pay data are for 2006, one year after the sales data.)
The variance in manager pay is large when compared, for example, with the variance in store
assistant pay. Thus the coefﬁcient of variation for manager pay is 23% (=2.59/11.24), compared
to 5% (=0.23/5.02) for store assistants. This variance in fact parallels the variance in sales per
hour (coefﬁcient of variation=25%), and reﬂects signiﬁcant differences in how much our
organisation values its store managers. It is true that a source of this variation might be
differences in regional economic conditions. However, variation in the managers’ pay by Labour
Force Survey region (twenty-one in total) explains only about a quarter of the total, suggesting
other important sources of variance such as store performance and/or management ability.
3.2 Key Behavioural Indicators
All managers who had worked in their stores for at least one year as of early 2006 were surveyed.
This minimum tenure restriction ensures that every store manager has enough evidence for their
performance to be adequately assessed. The survey, produced by the company’s Human
Resources department, contains twenty-eight questions covering six management practice areas,
or key behavioural indicators (KBIs): sales focus, commercial awareness, developing people,
drive and personal development, leadership, and planning and organising. It took a dedicated HR
team, store and area managers ﬁve months to collect, verify and summarise these data.
Each store manager had ﬁrst to ﬁll in the survey questionnaire. Those self-assessments were
later discussed with the area managers, and then, based on the evidence supporting the
self-assessment results, agreed assessments were produced. There were three assessment grades
for each characteristic: development need, capable and strength. The descriptions of the grades –
the same for all stores – correspond to inadequate performance, performance up to the standard
required by the company, and performance above the standard. The agreed assessments were
later grouped, and the aggregate grades for each of the six KBIs were produced. We were
granted access to these aggregate grades. An overall management grade can also be calculated,
as a weighted average of the six KBI grades. 0.82% of the sample achieved the highest overall
grade, A; 14.3% a B; 65.3% a C; 14.7% a D; and 4.9% an E. The actual descriptions of each
KBI are reported in Tables 3.2 – 3.7.
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KBI & components Capable Strength
1. Maintains high op-
erational and visual
standards.
Delivers the company operational and visual
standards to drive sales performance.
Generates a passion for high operational
and visual standards in everyone. Store
consistently delivers high standards.
2. Uses company initi-
atives to increase sales.
Makes sure all training and selling initiatives
are delivered.
Gains commitment from all team members
so that training and selling initiatives be-
come properly embedded.
3. Exhibits and devel-
ops selling skills within
the team.
Displays thorough product knowledge and
effective selling skills. Flexes selling conver-
sations according to consumer types.
Can role model excellent selling skills. Ob-
serves performance on sales ﬂoor, gives
feedback and recommendations for im-
provement.
4. Uses reports and
information to improve
sales performance.
Reviews and analyses reports and sales in-
formation to improve performance.
Uses information to identify additional
selling opportunities.
5. Uses knowledge of
fashion trends to en-
hance sales perform-
ance.
Keeps up to date with fashion trends, can
relate them to products and uses this know-
ledge in selling.
Develops in others a knowledge of fash-
ion trends and an ability to incorporate this
when selling.
As can be seen from Tables 3.2 – 3.7, the KBI survey is broad, covering an extensive range of
practices, from the more administrative (such as planning and organising, Table 3.7) to the more
entrepreneurial (such as commercial awareness, Table 3.3). Admittedly, there are overlaps, for
example, both sales focus (Table 3.2) and leadership (Table 3.4) reward team building. At the
same time, the important commercial awareness KBI appears to be unique. It emphasizes
monitoring local competition, adjusting manpower subject to the wage budget constraint, and
making the best use of space on the sales ﬂoor - none of which are touched on by the other KBIs.
As we will show by comparing the estimates for the KBIs entered separately and jointly into the
sales equation, it is the characteristics of commercial awareness that matter for productivity.
Table 3.8 shows that the performance of store managers with respect to the KBIs varies
considerably. About 20% were rated as development need for sales focus, commercial
awareness, leadership, and drive and personal development, and around a quarter were rated at
the highest grade. The best-performing KBI is planning and organising, in which 95% of the
store managers achieve satisfactory performance. The weakest results are for developing people,
with 40% of store managers underperforming.
The KBI grades are predictably correlated with store size and manager salaries. Managers
with a higher grade are found in larger stores, in more competitive areas, employing more people
and receiving higher pay. Average labour productivity too tends to increase with the KBI grade.
In the next section we apply a more rigorous analysis to these observations.
20Table 3.3 Key behavioural indicators: Commercial awareness
KBI & components Capable Strength
1. Aligns own plans to
business priorities.
Makes plans for peak trading periods to en-
sure effective use of resources.
Knows the trading period strategy and uses
it to identify priorities and determine plans
which will provide the best ﬁnancial results.
2. Uses knowledge
of products to maximise
business performance.
Knows the performance of all departments
and key products within each of these.
Makes the best use of space on the sales
ﬂoor given the store’s product mix.
3. Delivers controllable
costs.
Can manage payroll and puts plans to de-
liver wage control.
Is ﬂexible and can adjust manpower to de-
liver a great experience for customers while
achieving the wage control targets.
4. Observes own and
monitors competitors’
activity.
Constantly reviews the store through the
eyes of a customer and makes adjustments
to improve the shopping experience.
Monitors local competitors and considers
shopping experiences in other retailers to
make improvements in own store.
Table 3.4 Key behavioural indicators: Leadership
KBI & components Capable Strength
1. Is a positive role
model.
Behaviour and work of a high professional
standard. Respected by colleagues.
Is a highly credible role model, an inspiration
for others.
2. Is an effective com-
municator.
Sets clear expectations of performance
standards. Communicates information
clearly and concisely.
Listens and responds well. Encourages
sharing of ideas. Adapts the style of com-
munication to build rapport.
3. Builds winning
teams.
Encourages a sense of friendly competition
and cooperation. Praises and recognises
good performance.
Generates a positive ‘buzz’. Coaches and
motivates the team to succeed while main-
taining good working relationships.
4. Makes sound de-
cisions.
Can be relied on to make decisions right for
the store and the business.
Makes excellent decisions and considers
their immediate and long-term impact. Puts
plans in place to overcome potential barri-
ers.
5. Managers poor per-
formance.
Takes appropriate and timely action to ad-
dress poor performance.
Differentiates between conduct and capabil-
ity, identiﬁes the root cause of poor perform-
ance and manages it accordingly.
6. Deals with and re-
solves problems.
Can deal with problems, seeks advice when
needed to resolve them.
Tackles problems in their early stages and
can make sound decisions to resolve them
objectively.
7. Manages change. Reacts to change positively and sells the be-
neﬁts to the team.
Puts plans in place to implement change
successfully. Deals with resistance in a pos-
itive way.
21Table 3.5 Key behavioural indicators: Developing people
KBI & components Capable Strength
1. Uses company re-
cruitment and induction
practices.
Follows company procedures in recruitment.
Provides induction to new hires.
Has a good working knowledge of recruit-
ment practices. Follows up all inductions to
ensure their effectiveness.
2. Uses training to con-
tinuously improve per-
formance.
Ensures everyone complete standard train-
ing requirements. Keeps training records up
to date.
Identiﬁes training need and uses available
materials to deliver effective training.
3. Uses feedback to im-
prove performance.
Gives genuine praise and constructive criti-
cism to improve performance.





Ensures all employees attend one review
meeting each year to agree on business
goals and identify development opportunit-
ies.
Follows up the formal performance review
with informal reviews of the agreed goals
and development activities.
5. Develops people for
the future.
Identiﬁes and develops individuals who
demonstrate potential and a desire to pro-
gress.
Has a succession plan in place and devel-
ops talent so that positions can be ﬁlled in-
ternally.
Table 3.6 Key behavioural indicators: Drive and personal development
KBI & components Capable Strength
1. Is committed to com-
pany standards.
Shows commitment to achieve agreed per-
formance standards.
Strives to exceed performance standards.
2. Is motivated to suc-
ceed.
Demonstrates passion and enthusiasm, is
motivated to succeed.
Is a self-starter, consistently passionate and
shows dedication to the task.
3. Responds to chal-
lenges positively.
Maintains a positive outlook and responds
to challenges well.




Maintains a personal development plan.
Can demonstrate improvements in skills,
knowledge and behaviour over time.
Looks for opportunities to enhance skills
and knowledge. Shows initiative to improve
self.
22Table 3.7 Key behavioural indicators: Planning and organising
KBI & components Capable Strength
1. Plans in advance. Uses company materials to plan in advance. Plans ahead on a daily and weekly basis
and carefully considers forthcoming trading
periods.
2. Prioritises tasks. Considers tasks according to importance
and urgency. Understands the difference
between ‘must do’, ‘should do’ and ‘nice to
do’.




Delegates tasks and follows them up to en-
sure deadlines are met.
Delegates appropriately and takes time to
put tasks into context. Monitors progress so
that deadlines are met.
Source: survey documentation, minimal editing applied
Note: A “development need” was given for sub-standard performance.
Table 3.8 Averages of key variables by KBI grade
KBI Grade % FTE Store Manager Competition, Productivity
personnel space pay 1 to 4
Sales dvlp. need 17.14 6.49 119.57 10.48 2.24 55.45
focus capable 59.18 7.97 142.93 10.95 2.41 59.47
strength 23.68 11.61 185.37 12.55 2.82 61.60
Commercial dvlp. need 17.55 6.56 125.73 10.29 2.19 55.59
awareness capable 56.33 7.75 139.41 10.96 2.31 58.49
strength 26.12 11.72 185.24 12.54 3.07 62.80
Leadership dvlp. need 17.55 7.30 136.25 10.55 2.40 57.34
capable 54.29 7.49 132.71 10.83 2.27 59.24
strength 28.16 11.48 188.28 12.53 2.86 61.01
Developing dvlp. need 39.59 7.33 134.50 10.65 2.31 58.32
people capable 44.90 8.24 140.66 11.08 2.39 59.36
strength 15.51 12.74 210.02 13.24 3.09 62.20
Drive and dvlp. need 21.22 6.87 125.04 10.61 2.29 57.20
personal capable 49.80 8.00 140.58 11.10 2.35 59.43
development strength 28.98 10.83 180.95 11.95 2.80 61.04
Planning and dvlp. need 4.49 7.13 135.22 11.02 2.36 60.56
organising capable 42.04 6.97 124.62 10.54 2.18 57.53
strength 53.47 9.97 169.29 11.80 2.71 60.86
Note: 1 – number of competitors 1-17 (bottom 25%), 4 – number of competitors more than 51 (top 25%).
23244 Regression results
4.1 Store sales
Table 4.1 reports the main regression results for our preferred translog speciﬁcation of the sales
function (equation 2.10). The regression produces plausible estimates and shows high overall
signiﬁcance. The input elasticities are meaningful, implying returns to scale of 0.765. That
returns to scale are less than 1 makes economic sense, because there are other inputs in particular
management.
The translog speciﬁcation reveals the short-run dependency of the labour input elasticity on
the time of the year, store space (coefﬁcients not shown) and, most importantly, store manager.
Thus, managers with higher grades for the planning and organising KBI achieve a higher labour
input elasticity in the short run - presumably as a result of their better ability to mobilise labour
at times when its efﬁciency is the highest. However, this effect is not preserved in the long run,
unlike other effects of management, as follows.
Looking at the KBI grades, we enter them separately and jointly with the aim of detecting
overlaps and ﬁnding which one is the most important. Most KBIs are individually signiﬁcant,
but commercial awareness is the largest. As we see, only the KBIs for commercial awareness
and leadership retain signiﬁcance when entered jointly. This result indicates substantial
intercorrelations between different KBIs, presumably as a result of overlapping deﬁnitions. That
said, evidently it is the special characteristics of commercial awareness which are important for
productivity, since its coefﬁcients are similar whether entered separately or jointly. As noted
above, these characteristics consist mainly of entrepreneurial skills, such as monitoring local
competition and making the best use of resources subject to the wage budget rule.
Store managers rated capable for commercial awareness achieve 11% higher annual sales
than their colleagues with grade development need, and those with grade strength achieve 17%
higher sales. All else equal, these differences in sales mean the same differences in labour
productivity between stores. Thus, given our interpretation of the grade capable as deﬁning the
minimum appropriate performance, the contribution of commercial awareness practices to
productivity is 11%, and the contribution of management ability beyond fulﬁlling the minimum
practice is 6% (=17-11).
Another KBI, leadership, also makes a difference to productivity. Managers with grade
capable for this KBI are 6% more productive than those with a development need; but there
appears to be no further improvement in productivity associated with extra ability on this KBI.
Other KBIs are insigniﬁcant.
The signs on other control variables are consistent with conventional economic reasoning.
Thus, having more workers on short contract hours enters positively (0.19 to 0.28), presumably
because such workers create a ﬂexible workforce, leading to higher productivity when demand is
25Table 4.1 Main regression results (equation (2.10))
Dependent variable: Log Sales
Input Elasticities (N=12,671)
Labour, short-run
Labour X planning=“d.need” 0.176
Labour X planning=“capable” 0.271**




Sales focus “capable” 0.062*** 0.001
“strength” 0.123*** 0.034
Commercial “capable” 0.106*** 0.106***
awareness “strength” 0.184*** 0.172***
Leadership “capable” 0.082*** 0.057**
“strength” 0.092*** 0.014
Developing “capable” 0.018 − 0.019
people “strength” 0.075*** − 0.001
Drive & pers. “capable” 0.032 0.004
development “strength” 0.084*** 0.028
Planning & “capable” − 0.009 − 0.051
organising “strength” 0.036 − 0.064
Other Controls
Weekly contract 0–4 0.283***
hoursb 5–14 0.189**
15–29 0.194**
Ln(area average pay) 0.953***
Area unemployment rate − 2.788*
Ln(store assistant relative pay) 0.692***
Competitors in 18-30 0.002
catchment areac 31-51 0.147***
52+ 0.278***
Error-correction term (1-γ ) 0.579***
Proxy for last year’s shock (ξ) 0.681***
Standard errors of regression: σv = 0.128 (within-store); ση = 0.107 (between-store).
a “Development need” is the base category.
b Share of of employees working 30+ hours per week is the base category.
c Number of competitors fewer than 17 (ﬁrst quartile of distribution) is the base category.
Other controls include: dummies for week and their interactions with changes in labour input, area manager dummies (20), location,
brand, average employee age, tenure, turnover, share of male employees, share of children’s products in total.
From this table onwards, ***, ** and * denote estimates signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
26turbulent. Paying higher wages relative to competitors’ enters positively (0.69) because better
quality workers are attracted. Sales tend to be higher in wealthier areas, and also where there are
clusters of competitors.
Finally, we observe that shocks to sales are quite persistent. About 40% (1−(1−γ)) of the
last week’s shock to sales carries over to the current week. Also, we calculate that, given the
estimate for ξi (0.68) and the long-run labour input elasticity of 0.44, the autoregression
parameter φ for the unobservable shock to sales is around 0.4 (=0.68*(1− 0.44)). The latter
result suggests signiﬁcant persistency of store-speciﬁc unobservables in the sales function.
4.2 Store manager pay
Table 4.2 reports the regression results for log store manager total annual pay in 2006. Most
important, the annual random noise term for sales (η) is a signiﬁcant determinant of pay, which
is consistent with the predictions of our incentive pay model (equation (2.8)). The 0.2 elasticity
result conﬁrms that pay varies less than one-to-one with sales, implying that managers do not
receive their exact marginal product of labour. Rather, being risk-averse, they surrender part of
the windfall pay in a lucky year (when η > 0) as an insurance against their loss of income in a
bad year (η < 0). Thus, a standard deviation change in η of 11% (see Table 4.1 for ση) causes a
2.2% change in a store manager’s pay (about £460 on average, given annual pay of £21,000).
Table 4.2 Determinants of store manager pay (equation (2.8))
Dependent variable: log total salary in 2006 Coefﬁcient Std.dev.
η (residual from the sales equation) 0.203 0.083**
Ln(area average pay for a similar job) 0.349 0.071***
Ln(FTE personnel) 0.288 0.023***
Store manager age 0.001 0.001
Experience with the company 0.002 0.001
Store manager is male 0.042 0.019**
“Strength” for developing people 0.051 0.031*
Other KBI grades insigniﬁcant




Number of observations 234
Note: Only managers still employed in 2006 as in 2005 are included, hence the smaller number of observations.
Table 4.2 also shows the effects of other determinants of manager pay. We see that pay is higher
for male store managers, and for those living in areas with higher pay and more competitors –
presumably reﬂecting the more generous outside options available to them. Managing more
workers attracts a premium as well, which is consistent with the greater difﬁculty of running a
27larger store, and the extra responsibilities that come with it.
At the same time, we do not ﬁnd a strong correlation between pay and most of the KBIs.
This ﬁnding holds whether or not we control for other determinants of manager pay, in particular
store workforce size and space which may also link with management ability. The implication is
that the KBIs measure a type of company-speciﬁc middle management ability which raises sales
in company stores, but which is not easily tradable on the outside labour market.
4.3 Robustness checks
We have already mentioned that our main regression results are robust to the type of the sales
function (Cobb-Douglas or translog) and input endogeneity. Tables 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 report the
results of extra checks of the robustness of the regression results for productivity and manager
pay to a selection of alternative speciﬁcations. Basically, we ﬁnd that most of our main
regression results are quite robust, although looking at our data from different angles does lend
some extra insights.
4.3.1 Store sales
First we address the issue of measurement error in the KBIs (speciﬁcation I in Table 4.3.1)
which might have caused some of the KBIs to be insigniﬁcant. Bloom and Van Reenen (2007)
ﬁnd that the variance of their management scores due to measurement error is from 25% to 42%
of the total (p. 1366). We do not have two or more independent observations for the same
manager, so we cannot correlate their results to estimate the extent of the measurement error.
Still, we can at least partially control for measurement error by including in the sales equation
the “noise controls” which might be correlated with KBI measurement errors, even though they
are probably irrelevant to sales.
We have some noise controls already in the equation. First, the KBIs control each other
because their measurement errors are correlated. Second, the area manager dummies, which are
rarely signiﬁcant on their own, should account for biases in the judgement of the area managers
who interviewed the store managers. Indeed, excluding the insigniﬁcant KBIs and area manager
dummies from the equation reduces the estimates for commercial awareness somewhat,
reﬂecting the attenuation bias introduced by measurement errors in this important KBI.
In addition to the existing noise controls, we use manager age, gender and experience with
the company. The inclusion of these variables leads to a small increase in the estimates for
commercial awareness compared to Table refresults, as expected. At the same time, it must be
remembered that the extent of measurement error in our data is likely to be much smaller than in
the average postal or telephone survey (the KBI survey was compulsory and store managers
were required to supply evidence to back up their responses), and is further reduced by having
only a few grades of management ability.
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I II III IV
Noise controls Resid. h’scedasticity Extra mgmt variables
Sales focus “capable” 0.010 0.007 0.010 0.004
“strength” 0.040 0.035 0.029 0.019
Commercial awareness “capable” 0.112*** 0.096*** 0.095*** 0.091***
“strength” 0.181*** 0.154*** 0.160*** 0.153***
Leadership “capable” 0.049** 0.042* 0.034 0.034
“strength” 0.007 − 0.004 − 0.005 − 0.009
Developing people “capable” − 0.020 − 0.010 − 0.031 − 0.044**
“strength” − 0.002 0.018 − 0.005 − 0.032
Drive & development “capable” 0.007 − 0.016 0.006 0.002
“strength” 0.032 0.034 0.024 0.017
Planning & organising “capable” − 0.059* − 0.044 − 0.043 − 0.059
“strength” − 0.069* − 0.058 − 0.058 − 0.070*
Manager gradea A (0.82% of sample) 0.207** 0.204**
B (14.3%) 0.080* 0.077*
C (65.3%) 0.067* 0.065*
D (14.7%) − 0.004 − 0.011
All “development need” (0.82%) − 0.076
All “capable” or higher (48.57%) 0.021
All “strength” (6.53%)b 0.038
a base category: grade E (the lowest).
b base category: at least one “development need”
All other controls remain.
We next focus on controlling for residual heteroscedasticity by allowing the variance of random
noise η to vary with workforce size (speciﬁcation II in Table 4.3.1). Here we ﬁnd some negative
correlation between residual variance and the workforce size, implying that sales in larger stores
are somewhat more predictable, but, again, our main regression results remain robust to this
speciﬁcation.
Finally, we introduce additional management variables – dummies for the overall
management grade (speciﬁcation III in Table 4.3.1) and bundles of KBIs with the same grade or
higher (speciﬁcation IV) – to see if there is a joint effect of several KBIs not captured by their
individual estimates. There is some evidence that sets of different abilities matter beyond their
individual components, supporting the management practice complementarity view (Macdufﬁe,
1995; Ichniowski et al., 1997). However, the overall effect of management bundles is not as
important as that of individual KBIs (see next section for some quantitative illustrations). The
complementarity effect appears to be particularly strong for the star managers with an overall
grade A, bringing an extra 20% improvement in labour productivity; but with such a small share
of these managers in our sample (less than 1%) this result must be taken with caution. For the
majority (80%) of managers with grades B or C there is virtually no difference in performance
29by grade. It is only the minority (19%) of managers with grades D or E who appear to be doing
worse than the rest, but even then the difference is on the brink of statistical signiﬁcance.
4.3.2 Store manager pay
We have experimented to ascertain whether the insigniﬁcance of the KBIs in the pay equation 8
is a result of (over)controlling for average pay in the area, or store size. However, the KBIs still
remain insigniﬁcant even after these variables have been excluded, while the other estimates stay
virtually unchanged. Thus, our earlier conclusion remains, that the market for management
ability, as measured by the KBIs, is limited.
We further check the robustness of the manager pay regression results by running equation
(2.8) on sub-samples formed by each grade of commercial awareness, and by stores with lower
than expected (η < 0) and higher than expected (η > 0) sales (Table 4.3.2). The estimates for the
determinants of store manager pay are fairly robust to sub-sampling from the overall sample.
There is no strong evidence to suggest that the main determinants of pay – actual vs. expected
sales (η), area average pay for a similar job, workforce size, and manager gender – differ in their
effects by grade of commercial awareness (see column“test equal p-val.” in Table 4.3.2).
Therefore, our simple speciﬁcation of the output equation for the incentive pay model (equation
(2.4)) with additive effects of effort, ability and luck is consistent with the data.
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Commercial awareness grades Test equal
Overall “dev.need” “capable” “strength” p-val.
η 0.203** 0.199 0.244** 0.075 0.763
Ln(av. pay for similar job) 0.349*** 0.351 0.294*** 0.435** 0.692
Ln(FTE personnel) 0.288*** 0.307*** 0.279*** 0.291*** 0.940
Store manager age 0.001 0.000 − 0.001 0.007** 0.001
Experience 0.002 0.001 0.005** − 0.006 0.044
Store manager is male 0.042** 0.018 0.076*** − 0.019 0.140
Sales focus “capable” − 0.001 − 0.044 0.017 − 0.007 0.369
“strength” 0.010 − 0.002 0.058 0.026 0.580
Commercial awareness “capable” 0.015
“strength” 0.020
Leadership “capable” − 0.001 0.005 0.001 − 0.171 0.141
“strength” 0.003 0.146 0.027 − 0.194 0.059
Developing people “capable” 0.009 − 0.042 0.005 0.177** 0.016
“strength” 0.051* n.a. 0.054 0.154** 0.053
Drive & development “capable” 0.000 0.045 − 0.024 − 0.007 0.231
“strength” − 0.035 n.a. − 0.062* − 0.001 0.157
Planning & organising “capable” − 0.023 − 0.001 − 0.059 0.071 0.065
“strength” − 0.037 − 0.008 − 0.085 n.a. 0.002
Number of observations 234 42 134 58
All other controls remain.
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5.1 Management and productivity: some illustrations
We ﬁnd that the most important KBI is commercial awareness. Variation in commercial
awareness is responsible for a sizeable portion of variation in productivity. We ﬁnd that moving
from the bottom quartile of the distribution of commercial awareness (i.e., development need,
18% of the sample) to the top quartile (strength, 26%) is associated with a 17% improvement in
labour productivity. The interquartile productivity range is 40%, so the interquartile range in
commercial awareness accounts for 43% (=17/40) of that in labour productivity. Continuing to
assume the cost of sales to be a constant fraction of sales, we calculate the interquartile TFP
range at 52%; so, commercial awareness accounts for 33% of variation in TFP.
Good management brings substantial economic beneﬁts, which is easy to calculate having
the distribution of managers by grade and productivity differences between different grade
managers. Thus, given our regression results for the KBIs and the distribution of labour between
managers of different grades, if all managers had a development need for commercial awareness,
the total annual sales in 2005 would be 11.5% (£27.54 million) lower than actually observed.
Company-wide organisational management practices also help bring out the beneﬁts of good
store management. Our results allow us to calibrate the effects of two of such practices. One is
allocating better managers to bigger stores (see Table 3.3). If all managers had stores of the same
size, the total gains in labour productivity would be 10.5% instead of the 11.5% reported above.
The other practice is incentive pay contracts. The difference between the productivity results
for the capable and strength managers is signiﬁcant (17%–11%=6%), pointing out the
importance of management ability beyond the fulﬁlment of the minimum appropriate practice
requirements. If there were no incentive pay, there would presumably be no need to exert more
effort than was required to satisfy the minimum, in which case the average labour productivity
would be 2.4% less than observed (=0.06, the difference in productivity between strength and
capable, times the fraction of the workforce that the strength managers control, 40%).
Still, there is a potential to increase labour productivity by exploiting the existing pool of
store managers, as well as improving its quality through searching for, developing and rewarding
talented individuals. Thus, coaching the underperforming store managers so that they can fulﬁl
all the practice requirements under commercial awareness to attain grade capable would bring an
extra 2% gain in sales (=18%, the share of managers with a development need, times 11%, the
estimated increase in productivity from a development need to a capable). Furthermore, if all
managers were strength, the total sales would be 6.4% higher (=18% times 17%, the difference
between a development need and a strength, plus 56%, the share of managers with a capable,
times 6%, the difference in productivity between a capable and a strength).
335.2 Our results and other studies
Our ﬁndings about the importance of store management are consistent with the literature. Since
store managers are hard to allocate among stores in the short run, our results help explain part of
persistent inter-workplace differences in productivity documented in the earlier literature
(Bartelsman and Doms, 2000; Grifﬁths et al., 2006).
It is also instructive to compare our quantitative ﬁndings for management with those in the
studies closest to ours. Our estimate of the share of the interquartile range of TFP explained by
management, 33%, is higher than Bloom and Van Reenen’s (2007) 10-23%. We propose two
explanations for this difference. First, in a cross-company study, such as theirs, it is harder to
control for company-speciﬁc factors affecting the relationship between management and
productivity. As a result, this relationship may be blurred by “contingent management” (pp.
1371-4). Second, the blurring may occur through combining many management practices, some
of which are irrelevant to productivity, into one z-score, which makes for a noisier management
regressor and an attenuated regression estimate. Thus, when we put grades from all the KBIs
into a management z-score its estimate becomes 0.048, and its interquartile movement is
associated with only a 6% movement in productivity, thereby accounting for only 6/52=12% of
interquartile TFP range, close to Bloom and Van Reenen’s 10-23%.
At the same time, if aggregating individual practices into a z-score reduces the importance of
management due to attenuation bias, the question arises as to why our estimate of the share of
interquartile productivity range explained by management (43%) is close to Grifﬁths et al.’s
(2006) 40%, which they derive from the management score aggregating over 11 positions. The
reason seems to be fewer controls used in their study, a possibility they do anticipate (p. 523).
Thus, when we control only for labour input (as they do), the interquartile movement in our
management z-score explains nearly 70% of interquartile productivity range, and “commercial
awareness” together with “developing people” accounts for 75% of productivity’s 90/10 range.
Clearly, the degree of detail in management data and statistical controls are equally important for
the quantitative results of a management study.
We have also accounted for the interrelation between competitiveness, management ability
and productivity, which is an important theme in the literature on management and performance
(Nickell, 1996), by controlling for the number of competitors in the catchment area. We ﬁnd a
positive correlation between KBI grades and area competitiveness, as did Bloom and
Van Reenen (2007, p. 1389). Coupled with the positive impact of management on store sales
performance, this ﬁnding supports the view that competition improves economic performance by
“weeding out” the bad managers (Grifﬁths, 2001; Syverson, 2004). However, controlling for
management, there is also a large independent effect of competition in the area, implying that
better management is not the only channel through which competition improves economic
performance. Thus, in addition to toughening the selection of managers, competition may proxy
34for the effects of area unobservables (e.g., agglomeration effects) on productivity.
While most of our ﬁndings on management are consistent with the existing literature, that
managerial ability in developing people is insigniﬁcant seems to contradict the many studies
showing the importance of HRM practices for ﬁrm performance (Ichniowski et al., 1997, such
as). But this ﬁnding should be taken in the context of our organisation. Clothing retail is a
turbulent business with predominantly part-time sales assistants who are normally unskilled and
inexpensive to replace. In such an environment it is hard to develop a rationale for
comprehensive, long-term relationships between store managers and sales assistants, and so the
lack of signiﬁcance of developing people for manager pay is reasonable.
Turning to the manager pay results, our 0.2 estimate of the elasticity of pay wth respect to
unexpected sales is broadly similar to the estimates of Murphy (1986), 0.14, Barro and Barro
(1990), 0.17, and Conyon and Murphy (2000), 0.12 for the UK and 0.27 for the US, for the
elasticity of CEO compensation to share returns. Admittedly, there are limits to which we can
compare the results from such different regression speciﬁcations. But, noting that the annual
random noise to sales η may be regarded as a gross unexpected return to assets, it is reassuring
that our estimate of the key incentive pay parameter appears to be broadly consistent with those
previously reported.
Our results ﬁt with the literature even more closely when it comes to the elasticity of
manager pay with respect to ﬁrm (store) size. Our 0.29 estimate is well within the range of
estimates reported: 0.22 for UK and 0.41 for US ﬁrms (Conyon and Murphy, 2000); 0.32 for US
banks (Barro and Barro, 1990); 0.25 for Canadian publicly traded ﬁrms (Zhou, 2000); and 0.25
for small U.S. ﬁrms (total assets up to 150 mln. 1993 U.S. Dollars) in Cyert et al. (2002). This
range is quite narrow, considering differences in samples with respect to time, country and
industry. That the estimates are so close has long been a puzzle (Rosen, 1992).
Finally, our ﬁnding that the pay system does not reward manager ability (i.e., commercial
awareness) as such is surprising. Still, this ﬁnding can be explained in terms of the market for
local managerial talent being limited, an argument which has been advanced before (e.g.
Huselid, 1995, p. 668).
35366 Conclusions
In this paper, we have looked into the black box of the management input in the production
function of a ﬁrm. We have had to conﬁne ourselves to the short run, the trading year, when
selection and development of managers, and allocating them among stores is given. Within this
year, we have found which middle management practices actually affect sales and productivity
in a competitive, proﬁt-maximising environment, and how company monitoring and incentive
pay policies direct this management input. Ours is one of the few studies concerning the
important middle management tier (most others concern CEOs), and this is a line of research we
hope will be pursed further. Let us consider our ﬁndings in turn.
Our data are based on an accurate company survey of management practices and ability. The
practice we found most important is commercial awareness encapsulating entrepreneurial skills,
such as monitoring local competition and making efﬁcient use of available resources. The KBI
developing people, in this type of retail organisation, with high-turnover sales staff, is not
important as might be expected.
The total gain in productivity associated with commercial awareness is 17%, and it explains
33-43% of the interquartile difference in productivity, depending on the measure. We argue that
part of the impact of commercial awareness (11%) is due to the practice itself, and part (6%) to
superior management ability in carrying out the practice. Different company policies are
presumably applied to secure each of these effects. Monitoring the correct implementation of
commercial awareness practices secures the 11% part of the gain, and the further 6% comes
from incentivising the store managers with an appropriate pay system.
As for the workings of this manager pay system, we show that the term for unexpected
annual sales (η) is a signiﬁcant and economically important determinant of pay. The process of
salary review apparently works to give an expected sales value for the year for the manager in
her store (which we assume is determined by the sales function we estimate), and
positive/negative deviations are proportionately rewarded/punished. This ﬁnding is consistent
with the agency model of asymmetric information, coupled with risk aversion among managers.
The contrasts between our pay results for middle managers and those from studies of CEOs
are noteworthy. Our 0.20 estimate of the elasticity of middle manager pay with respect to
unexpected sales is similar to that from CEO studies. There is also a similar size elasticity. Both
results suggest that similar incentive mechanisms are at work at the middle as well as the top of
the management hierarchy. On the other hand, we ﬁnd that abler managers do not receive higher
pay all else equal. The implication here is that middle management ability is more specialised
and less tradable, unlike CEO ability, where the market is more open. This ﬁnding will explain
why companies hire their CEOs on the open market, yet develop their middle management
resources in-house – as a source of competitive advantage which cannot easily be bid away.
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